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MAKING SENSE OF ANIMAL PAIN: 
AN ENVIRONMENTAL THEODICY 
L. Stafford Betty 
No present theodicy, including John Hick's, makes adequate sense of animal 
pain. Hick fails at the point that he enlists animal pain exclusively in the 
service of human soul growth. Frederick Ferre is correct to point out that this 
solution is too anthropocentric. The present theodicy avoids this mistake by 
showing that pain, from the amoeba's to our own, is crucial not only to the 
betterment of souls but to their very origination, a process beginning long 
before man evolved on the planet. Creation is the process by which God is 
multiplying his own experience, and this process necessarily requires eons, 
necessarily starts with the lowest forms of life, and necessarily entails pain 
and suffering. The resulting good justifies all the howls and lamentations of 
the planet from its inception. 
Introduction 
For many years an honest and comprehensive theodicy has been my main 
philosophical passion. John Hick's masterpiece Evil and the God of Love l 
made good sense to me when I first discovered it; when I began writing my 
first novel, The Rich Man,2 my intent was to dress Hick's "soul-making" 
theodicy in fictive attire. But the problem of evil, which I thought Hick had 
solved and whose solution I was determined to popularize, did not entirely 
stop nagging me. I felt that I had made sense of human pain and suffering, 
even to the extent of a holocaust, but I began to be concerned about animal 
pain. What purpose could it serve? Why was nature "red in tooth and claw"? 
I remembered a grisly film, The Hellstrom Chronicle, which portrayed the 
unbelievable brutality of insects. I dug out Thoreau's Walden and reread his 
famous description of an ant battle. "For numbers and for carnage it was an 
Austerlitz or Dresden,"3 he concluded. And I had to agree. I thought about 
the animal films on Educational TV that my children watch and wondered 
why God-we are assuming in this paper that He exists-had designed the 
animal kingdom as a mutual eating society. Why hadn't He made animals 
dirt-eaters and regulated their numbers in some more civilized way? I looked 
again to Hick for the answer and found none that was satisfactory. I looked 
at other attempts by leading thinkers to make sense of animal pain and found 
them even more wanting than Hick's. Would the reason that "the cat not only 
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eats the mouse but teases and tortures it first"4 have to remain a profound 
mystery, as Nels Ferre, one of the most thoughtful theodicists of the past 
generation, wrote a quarter century ago? 
I could not let the matter rest at that. If God exists-and I have argued 
elsewhere along teleological lines that there is much evidence He does5-
there has to be as good a reason for animal suffering as for human. In this 
paper I will argue that there is an intelligible reason for animal pain, and that 
this reason is consistent with a full-fledged theism, that is, with a God who 
is infinitely loving and powerful. This "environmental theodicy" will justify 
the ways of God not only to man but to man's entire environment. It will 
seem at first glance repugnant to many, but that may be only because it is so 
strange. In any case, a philosopher's task is to build a syst~m which is 
internally consistent and which accommodates the facts of our universe. I 
think that this one does. 
The Failure of Other Theodicies 
Theodicy is the branch of philosophy that is concerned to show how God 
can coexist with evil of all kinds. Depending on the definition of God that 
you work with, there mayor may not be a problem. For example, if you think 
of God as all-good but not all-powerful, there is no problem: God, though 
He wants to relieve his creation of unnecessary, excessive, or destructive 
suffering, is unable to, for He did not create the basic stuff of the universe 
and thus is not its master. In this case there is no contradiction between God's 
and evil's coexistence. But for the classical theist, who holds that God is the 
universe's perfectly good, perfectly powerful Creator and Master, there is a 
huge problem. As Hick states it: "if God is perfectly loving, God must wish 
to abolish all evil; and if God is all-powerful, God must be able to abolish 
all evil. But evil exists; therefore God cannot be both omnipotent and per-
fectly loving."6 
Hick is of course concerned to show that the dilemma is only apparent, and 
many, including myself, believe that on the whole he succeeds. His entire 
theodicy turns on the twin concepts of (I) soul-making through the respon-
sible exercise of freedom and (2) "epistemic distance." By epistemic distance 
he means God's keeping Himself (or Herself-God is of course sexless) and 
his influence at a distance from humanity so that persons will not be over-
whelmed and in effect forced to do the will of God when otherwise they might 
not. What person, after all, could defy the divine will if God in his infinite 
beauty and attractiveness were front and center for the person to see? Hick 
believes that God keeps his distance not in order to punish us but to give our 
wills free reign; only by exercising our wills in a world that gives us as much 
reason to deny God as to affirm Him, to ignore Him as to take Him into 
account, do we grow in stature as persons, and thereby become of value to 
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both God and to ourselves. If someone were to object that God might have 
been able to accomplish the same result by simply willing us into existence 
already perfected, Hick's reply would be that such a thing would be as im-
possible as creating a "square circle." No one faults God's omnipotence 
because He cannot create a square circle, for a square circle is not a possible 
thing to create; it is unintelligible nonsense masquerading as a real thing 
through a trick of language. In the same way a "man perfect from the begin-
ning" is not a possible thing. Not even Omnipotence can bring off something 
that is intrinsically impossible. As a result we suffer in a world without God, 
or rather with only hints of Him. Such suffering is the necessary price to pay 
for growing into perfected beings. What we do not accomplish in this lifetime 
we will accomplish, always with God's help (as opposed to coercion), in 
future time; God has all the time in the world, and He is in no hurry. The 
final result, eons hence, will be a communion of perfected souls composed 
of all human beings-and other kinds of persons (angels, extraterrestrials, 
etc.)-who have ever lived. 
It is not possible to summarize Hick in a way that does him justice, for his 
theodicy is exceedingly rich and well nuanced. Suffice it to say for now that 
many believe it to work with respect to evil that befalls, or is committed by, 
mankind. It shows how a perfectly good and powerful God can logically 
coexist with human pain and suffering, including the most horrendous in-
stances of it in human history. In the famous words of Pope in his Essay on 
Man: 
All Nature is but art, unknown to thee; 
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see; 
All discord, harmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good. (Epistle I, 289-292) 
But Hick's case for animal pain falls short. This is not so because he is less 
than fully aware of the problem. While distinguishing between the peculiarly 
spiritual quality of human suffering and the "lower-order" suffering of animals, 
Hick does not minimize the very great pain that animals experience. He recog-
nizes that "most animals are violently killed and devoured by other species"7 
and that "when one of the higher mammals is in a situation in which a human 
would feel intense pain-for example, the situation of being bumed-it...is 
undergoing an experience of pain analogous to our own. "8 Hick does not duck 
the issue. Indeed he is very critical of various stratagems used by theologians to 
make sense of animal pain. But his own solution does not work much better. 
He accounts for animal pain by pointing out the gains for us that result: 
... sentient nature supports and serves its human apex ... by helping to consti-
tute an independent natural order to which man is organically related and 
within which he exists at an epistemic distance from ... God.9 
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Hick is saying here that God made animals prey on each other as a means of 
epistemically distancing human beings from God's Kingdom. The bloody 
slaughter of the animal kingdom leaves no doubt that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with our world; it induces us, but does not compel us, 
to yearn for and work for a blessedness that cannot be ours here, and it is 
this free yearning and working, Hick says, that builds character and gradually 
perfects the soul. What Hick is not willing to say is that animals themselves 
are undergoing a process of soul-making analogous to our own. As a result, 
his theodicy does not treat animals as valuable ends in themselves, and there-
fore their suffering is much less explicable than human suffering, which 
serves the purposes of soul-making. 
Theists who insist on making sense of animal pain criticize Hick's position 
for its "frank anthropocentrism. "10 Frederick Ferre states the dilemma facing 
Hick and like-minded theodicists: 
if God s goodness, despite the reality of human suffering, is to be vindicated 
by the Free Will Defense, thell it seems that animal suffering //lust be dis-
missed as trivial. But if animal pain is to be given significant moral weight, 
then it seems that the problem of evil cannot be relieved by appeals to 
considerations, like freedom and moral responsibility, that are applicable 
primarily or exclusively to human beings. II 
For the environmental theist this "minimizing of animal worth" is "an unac-
ceptable diminishing of the concepts of divine love and justice by restricting 
their effective scope to human history. "12 
Do other theodicies fare better than Hick's? On the contrary, they fare much 
worse. One line of argument is that animals do not really suffer, but only appear 
to. This argument flies in the face of common experience and could be taken 
seriously only by someone far removed from the farmyard. As Ferre says: 
There is no practical doubt that, in the wild as well as in domesticity, animals, 
appropriately to their species, see and hear and feel pain, that they look for 
food, try to hide, pursue each other, establish truces, are more or less clever, 
court one another, intend to trap, try to escape, defend their young, stake out 
territory, warn of danger, grieve over loss, tease, and play.13 
A different line of argument, one recently defended by Peter Geach, holds 
that God is indifferent to animal suffering, but that this indifference does not 
constitute cruelty. And why not? Because God, not being an animal Himself, 
cannot be expected to be aware of what it is like "to undergo purely animal 
torments. "14 R. W. K. Paterson finds this position inadequate because it por-
trays God as being culpably ignorant. As he says, "A being is not omniscient 
merely because he knows everything that he can logically know. An omni-
scient being knows everything that is knowable. "15 Apart from this counter-
argument, a God who does not understand what even we understand is fatally 
incompetent. 
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Two other theodicies are worth mentioning here. One, at least as old as 
Calvin, but recently resurrected by Christian fundamentalists, blames animal 
suffering either on Adam's sin or the earlier fall of the angels, which sub-
verted the natural order and set one species preying on another. This approach 
amounts to buck-passing, for who but God could decree that the animals 
would have to suffer on account of Adam's sin? Moreover, what kind of God 
would punish one species for the sin of another? This approach involves 
insuperable difficulties. The other theodicy-championed, incidentally, by 
Rabbi Harold Kushner in his bestselling book Why Bad Things Happen to 
Good People-says in effect that God does not have the power to remove 
suffering and pain even when He might want to. Many process theologians 
take a basically similar approach, though they are of course far more sophis-
ticated than Kushner. Such a theodicy does in fact logically solve the problem 
of evil, but it leaves behind a God whom most theists cannot relate to, a god 
who is less than God. It trades away God's omnipotence for a solution to the 
problem of evil, including the evil done to animals. 16 In doing so it gives 
away too much. It cuts the knot rather than unravelling it. 
The approach taken by the great majority of ordinary Christians and by 
many of the most thoughtful Christian theologians when asked why animals 
suffer is to say they don't know. As Nels Ferre confesses, "the ultimate 'why' 
eludes us. "17 For many this admission of ignorance will always seem the 
wisest, most honorable answer to give. It is not the answer, however, that 
pleases the philosopher. It is no coincidence that Nels Ferre's son, Frederick, 
is sounding a clarion call for a "revolution"18 in theodicy which takes animal 
suffering into full account. The father's interest has been passed down to the 
son, and resignation in the face of apparent contradiction has been trans-
formed into impatience. What follows is the fruit of my own impatience. 
A Possible Theodicy for the Environmental Theist 
How is pain and suffering-animal as well as human-made intelligible in 
a universe governed by a God who is Infinite Power, Goodness, Beauty, Love, 
Knowledge, and Joy? 
India's ancient Upanishads are a convenient place to start (though we shall 
diverge from them below). The seers whose thoughts are recorded there view 
God-or Brahman, as they call the Eternal-as a "Mass of Consciousness" 
which "shines forth, vast, self-luminous" (Mundaka, III, i, 7). Brahman is 
Pure Consciousness. It is not conscious of anything outside Itself; Its mode 
of consciousness is so different from our own that the seers often refer to It 
in the neuter: It is not personal in a way even remotely analogous to the way 
that we are personal. There is no principle of differentiation in It; It is not in 
any way limited by an association with matter; It is undefiled Pure Spirit. 
Somehow, out of this vast Being of Pure Consciousness, the world arises. 
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"As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, 
as hair grows on the head and the body of a living man-so does everything 
in the universe arise from the Imperishable" (Mundaka, I, i, 7). Brahman 
"expands," differentiates itself, creates. "It thought, 'May I be many; may I 
grow forth'" (Chandogya, VI, ii, 3). Thus out of Itself it projects the universe. 
Two features of Upanishadic thought are useful here. First, Brahman is 
depicted as creating the universe, not out of nothingness, but out of Itself. 
Second, as Pure Spirit It is not related in any intrinsic way to matter; matter, 
since it limits, is utterly alien to Brahman. It wiIl become clearer below why 
these two features are essential to the present theodicy. 
We are now in a position to ask about Brahman's/God's motive in creating. 
The famous Hymn of Creation in the Rig Veda suggests the obvious: "There-
fore rose Desire in the beginning, Desire, the primal seed and germ of Spirit" 
(Rig Veda, X, 129). Of course there was no actual time that this event first 
occurred. God is everlasting, and this "Desire" must be as everlasting as God 
is. And so must be the fruit of this desire, namely the universes and worlds 
that have existed throughout infinite time and space. 
Now let us go deeper and ask why God desired to create worlds. Was He 
in some way incomplete as He was? There is no compelling reason to assume 
this, for the standard Christian answer serves here very well: God created out 
of love; He desired to multiply his divine experience by making creatures 
who could share it; He desired to replicate Himself insofar as possible in 
order to fill the universe with his divine joy. The logic behind the Christian 
doctrine of the Trinity applies here: for the same reason that it was necessary 
for the Father to "beget" the eternal Son-out of love-it is necessary for 
Him to create his myriad creatures. Such creation adds (in some qualitative 
as well as quantitative way) to the love, and hence to the completeness, of 
the universe. There is more value, more good, in the universe than there would 
be without the creation. Even God undergoes a certain completing. This is 
not to say that God is incomplete without his universe of creatures; it is to 
say that his infinite completeness is more infinite than before: in the same 
way that in mathematics you can add any finite number to infinity and still 
have only infinity. 
Nothing said so far is outlandish or even implausible. Thinkers as far apart 
as process theologian John Cobb and "perennial philosopher" Frithjof Schuon 
would find ~uch to agree with in the above account. We have a God who 
desires to "multiply Himself," as it were, in order to maximize value in his 
universe. 19 What follows, however, is more problematic. It would be logical to 
say at this point, "All right, so why doesn't God simply create the various species 
that He desires to create, and create them in such a way that entails suffering 
only when it serves some high purpose, as animal suffering does not? And if 
He is going to create millions of species, why doesn't He just do it, as the 
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Book of Genesis says He did? Why drag out the affair so long? Why did He 
make life on Earth stagnate at the level of blue-green algae for 3 billion 
years?" The answer to these questions contains the germ of this theodicy. 
Let us assume that the Upanishads are correct in viewing God as "Pure 
Consciousness," or what we in the West might call Pure Spirit, and that matter 
is altogether alien to God's nature. (To say that matter is "alien" is not to say 
that it is evil; more will be said about this below.) The question arises, How 
is God going to go about creating a universe composed of a huge number of 
individual consciousnesses equipped to appreciate the divine life? Can He 
simply will it to be done, and there it is? No, says John Hick; it takes time, 
a lot of it, for souls to advance to the point where they would be equipped 
to live the divine life in a way that would be meaningful and even desirable 
to them. As we have seen, a "soul perfect from the beginning" is an unintel-
ligible cipher; it is not a possible thing (see p. 67 above). Hick is correct, but 
we must go further. I will try to show below that not only does the process 
of the human souls' perfecting take a great amount of time stretching far 
beyond one life on earth, but that the very process by which it grows into a 
human souL, !he process by which it defines itself and becomes a unique, 
persisting individual, demands time too, a vast sweep of it. 
What does this imply? The Bhagavad Gita says, "That which is not, never 
comes to be; that which is, never ceases to be" (2,16). The claim "That which 
is not, never comes to be" suggests the enormous problem of creating some-
thing that did not exist before. "That which is" is of course God, and God is 
all there is originally. The problem for God is one of "multiplying Himself"-
or, to change the metaphor, of "dividing Himself up"-in order to create 
others sufficiently distinct from Hill/self to experience the divine life as 
uniquely their own. The Gila says that this cannot be done, but we, while 
appreciating the tremendous insight of the Gita, are saying that it can, though 
only very slowly. The reason for the difficulty is that it is the nature of God 
to hold together; He is, after all, One Spirit, and there is no principle intrinsic 
to his Being that might bring about the division of Himself into innumerable 
others. Indeed this division would be impossible without the introduction of 
something alien to his Being. 
That "something," as I suggested above, is matter. The Upanishadic seers 
call it maya, an evocative word literally meaning the illusion created by a 
sorcerer. Matter is not strictly speaking illusory; it is precisely as real as God 
needs it to be. But it certainly does not possess, whatever else might be said 
about it, the degree of reality of Spirit, for Spirit is the very essence of God, 
and matter is something fashioned by God that is alien to his divine nature. 
Yet this matter is real enough to get the job done, and as such it is, as the 
Book of Genesis says, "very good." It is the stuff that God depends on to 
divide his otherwise indivisible Consciousness. The world of matter we live 
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in, including our own bodies, has one chief purpose: to aid the process of the 
one Spirit s division into the infinite manifold of souls that live as individuals 
cut offfrom the full divine Consciousness by their respective material bodies. 
A soul, in this view, is God attenuated and localized in a body and thereby 
individuated. There is no reason to assume, incidentally, that matter was as 
difficult to call into being as an individuated, persisting soul. Ex nihilo cre-
ation makes sense at the level of material existence, for there is no reason 
that matter should not exist, and exist instantaneously, if God wants it to; 
there is nothing in its nature that resists coming into being. 
But the individuation of Spirit presents God with a very great problem. 
God cannot create developed souls in an instant by fiat. He cannot "break 
off" a part of his Spirit (I hope, incidentally, that the reader will make allow-
ances for the present mode of speaking, which borders on the mode of Pla-
tonic myth)20 and put this newly created soul in a human body. An 
all-powerful God could artificially "hurry up" a soul, could unnaturally force 
the soul to occupy a body way in advance of its developmental timetable; but 
a wise, loving God would not choose this course, for the result would be 
either nugatory or monstrous: words like "zombie" or "freak" or "imbecile" 
perhaps dimly suggest the kind of being that would result. An all-powerful 
God could also artificially create a new soul without embodying it in matter 
at all-without, in other words, subjecting it to an eons-long developmental 
process in matter. But, again, a wise and loving God would not do this, for 
the result would be otiose. (What this means for our understanding of angels 
I will say below.) The closest analogy I can think of to suggest this second 
kind of violation of the soul's developmental timetable is a chemist's squeez-
ing out a drop from a syringe full of fluid. What happens to the drop that 
forms under pressure at the end of the syringe? If the pressure is released, 
the drop is spontaneously sucked back into the fluid in the syringe and 
absorbed. If the pressure is increased, the drop falls-and disintegrates. Look 
for the drop when it makes its first contact with an object and you will not 
find it. This analogy suggests what 1 believe would happen to the second kind 
of soul that we are imagining. If forcibly and unnaturally separated from its 
origin, it would disintegrate, it would not hold together as an individual. 
Alternatively, if allowed to act on its own according to its nature, it would 
immediately and spontaneously be sucked back into its source, where again 
it would cease to hold together as an individual. 
This is so not because God's power is limited but because a new soul 
functioning naturally in an advallced, complex body or in a realm of pure 
spirit is not a possible thing; it is a self-destructing concept with the same 
logical status as a square circle. Thus God's inability to call into instant being 
such an anomaly is no argument against his omnipotence; anymore than his 
inability to call into instant being a perfected soul (in Hick's sense) is an 
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argument against it. To repeat: God can do all things; a new soul functioning 
naturally in an advanced, complex body or in a realm of pure spirit is not a 
thing to do. Individuality is a learned habit, and habits, as we all know, take 
time to acquire. 
Now we are in a position to deal with animal pain and, more generally, the 
creeping pace of evolution upward toward more advanced organisms. The 
entire physical universe, as we saw above, exists for the sole purpose of 
individuating the One Spirit. But this process is difficult and, from God's 
point of view, unnatural. It begins humbly; it takes time. Relatively simple 
life forms such as germs and protozoa are but the first tiptoeing of Spirit into 
matter. Spirit's encounter with matter during the early stages of its individu-
ation is analogous to a rock's first encounters with a mallet. The rock does 
not split; it outwardly looks the same; but the future fault lines that will 
determine how the rock will divide are being cultivated. In like manner a 
soul is being cultivated by its contact with a body-the body of a protozoan, 
for example. When the "particle" or "wave" of Spirit that is in contact with 
the protozoan body departs the body at death, it returns to undifferentiated 
Spirit. But the particle is not the same as before. It is true that it loses its 
intactness as a distinct unit, which at this early stage is dependent on its being 
united with a specific material body; but it is closer to individuation, closer 
to becoming a permanent monad, than before. For the fault lines that will 
delineate the particle's unique and lasting individuality at some distant date 
in the future have deepened as a result of this latest concussive encounter 
with a material body. 
This state of affairs applies to all of the simplest organisms. They are the 
early gestation grounds for souls. They prepare the One Spirit for its division 
and crystallization into an infinite number of permanent subjectivities; in a 
word, for individuation. But individuation comes in stages. When Spirit is 
ripe for a greater degree of individuation, a soul does not return to the "Mass 
of Consciousness" upon the death of the body it is associated with; but neither 
does it exist in ontic isolation. Typically it would be attracted to a spiritual 
phylum, a Platonic Form; indeed, it might help create the form. When, for 
example, a cherry oak perishes, the soul of the oak might join, or help to 
create, the cherry oak phylum; in that case it would not retain its unique 
identity as "the soul of the cherry oak in John Smith's front yard," but would 
blend in with other cherry oak souls (again I ask the reader to make allow-
ances for this strange mode of speech), thereby more permanently establish-
ing the phylum. At some future time the segment of spirit that passed through 
stages as varied as protozoan and cherry oak would be ripe for a more 
advanced experience of individuation and become part of the spiritual stuff 
of a higher, more complex being. Eventually this complex spiritual being 
would consolidate its individual subjectivity so successfully that it would 
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retain its identity even when separated from a body, as is the case with 
(probably all) human beings. Thus we can speak meaningfully of survival of 
bodily death for human beings. Indeed the whole purpose of this long process 
is to cultivate individual souls who can exist independently of matter. For 
matter, let us not forget, is alien to Spirit; matter is only the necessary means 
of individuating Spirit into innumerable independently existing souls; it is 
the means of multiplying God's experience of his divine life. Although matter 
has the very greatest utilitarian importance, and is in this sense entirely good, 
it has no intrinsic worth, and no worth at all once its work is done. Indeed, 
matter would hinder the progress of a soul sufficiently evolved.21 (We will 
look at the ecological implications of this outlook below.) 
Now we are in a position to deal directly with animal pain. (It was the need 
to do so that spawned the entire worldview presented here, let us not forget.) 
Pain serves two vitally important purposes: (l) It goads the enfleshed soul 
forward toward a state of being that is finally and forever free of matter; in 
other words, it goads it upward to higher, more complex embodiments which 
are closer to the realm of bodiless being and which, more to the point of the 
sufferer, are painless; as a result it speeds the evolutionary process. (2) It 
focuses consciousness in on itself and thereby intensifies individuality, 
thereby preparing the soul for existence independent of matter. Most of us 
recognize at some instinctive level the truth of the claim that pain intensifies 
individuality; in any case we would all agree that it intensifies subjectivity. 
We see this in many ways. Consider the human level: our sharpest attention 
is generally given to solving problems, whereas we relax when life moves 
along smoothly. In a psychological sense problems are painful, the aftermath 
of their solutions pain-free. You are more alive-more alive as an individ-
ual-when you are solving a difficult calculus problem than when you relax 
following the solution. The same is true when the problem is a purely physical 
one, that is, when a person experiences physical pain. Nothing brings the 
mind to a single point so fast as physical pain. Acute physical pain is acutely 
individual. The claim that pain, whether mental or physical, sharpens one's 
sense of individuality is clarified when we consider the opposite of pain. 
Consider a cat, for example. Does it experience its individuality more acutely, 
is it more alert, more alive as the individual cat that it is, when it is on the 
threshold of consciousness purring in your lap or, with its fur straight up and 
its yellow eyes gleaming, fighting for its life in your backyard under a full 
moon? Or consider human beatitude, the very opposite of pain. When was 
the Buddha more alive to himself as an individual-when he was meditating 
blissfully or when he debated a heretic like Yamaka? For the Buddha the 
highest beatitude was necessarily and by definition trans-individual, whereas 
pain was necessarily linked to life as one individual among many. It is clear 
that in a universe geared to the evolution of individuals, pain would be a 
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distinct advantage. Alcoholism and suicide are evil because through them the 
individual flees the often harrowing process of soul-defining and soul-build-
ing that problem-solving and suffering of all kinds afford. Without pain the 
evolution of individuals might drag on forever. (This is not to say that pain 
is always desirable, for reasons we will see below. There will be a time to 
join the Buddha in his nirvana, or at least a modified version of it.) 
There is an important challenge to this theodicy that we must deal with 
more fully here. It does not seem fair at first glance that animal (or plant?) 
pain should be a vehicle for the evolution of souls which eventually learn to 
exist as individuals without dependence on matter. For what do the suffering 
animals get out of it? What do they derive themselves from their suffering? 
As we saw above, this is one of the primary challenges directed at anthropo-
centric solutions to the problem of evil. Against Hick's theodicy it is often 
objected that it may be all well and good for human beings that they experi-
ence intense hardship during the ordeal of soul-making, for they, after all, 
will recoup their losses in a future life; but animals do not recoup theirs, for 
they do not survive the death of their bodies. But this objection altogether 
misses the point. The soul of every human being has had a long history of 
soul-making hundreds of millions of years in duration. It should be clear by 
now that we are not saying that each of us was once a particular bird or a 
particular bug or a particular cedar tree, as a Hindu or Buddhist or Jain might 
say; we have nothing quite so precise and neat in mind. We are saying only 
the spiritual self we are now has undergone countless plunges into matter in 
one form or another in the slow process of its ripening into an enduring 
conscious individual. It is likely that at anyone time during the early history 
of the planet the soul that now makes you what you are was distributed 
throughout a huge popUlation of microscopic organisms. There is a sense, in 
other words, in which they are you now; you are what they have matured 
into. Was their suffering in vain then? Not the tiniest hair-prick of it. It has 
all gone into making you what you are, and they are included in what you 
are. A marvellous intimacy exists between ourselves and all life forms below 
us on the Great Chain of Being that have gone into our makeup. We are they, 
and they are we. And the process continues even now. The Spirit in today's 
algae will be a tiny fraction of a human soul in some distant future time. And 
the human souls that we are now will perhaps evolve into some unimaginable 
super-spirit eons from now. 
In such a world as the one postulated by this theodicy, there is no practical 
possibility of final and irremediable tragedy. It is possible to speak of tragedy 
only in the case of a being for whom personal extinction is felt as a threat to 
the quality of his life here and now. Animals do not feel such a threat, and 
their loss at death as intact selves is not to be mourned, especially if their 
souls' experiences, and indeed their very soul substance, goes into building 
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more evolved future souls. It would be tragic, on the other hand, if the soul 
of a human being failed to survive into a potentially infinite future, but this 
theodicy presumes (and demands, as does Hick's) such survival. A soul's 
ability to conceptualize such a future, I believe, is the mark of its ability to 
survive into it. 
With this the theodicy, at least in its present rough outline, is complete. We 
must now turn to some interesting implications. 
Implications of the Theodicy 
One of the most important questions that arises here deals with our relation 
to God. In particular, is the God that this theodicy implies a loving God? 
More basically, does a God worthy of the name, a God transcendent, remain 
after his plunge into matter? Is there any God left over to be loving? Or must 
the theist accommodate himself to some strange new concept of God wholly 
immanent in his creation? Must he give up his belief in a transcendent Deity 
who is perfectly powerful, good, loving, and knowing? 
There is nothing about this theodicy that 10gically requires God to be totally 
emptied out into his creation. God is infinite; his creation, however vast, 
is finite. As any mathematician can attest, infinity does not become less 
than infinite because some finite quantity is subtracted from it. God is such 
Infinity. 
But is this God a loving God? For if He is not, then however successful 
the theodicy in some respects, it fails at the critical point. It seems fair to say 
that it implies a God who is not less loving but more loving than orthodox 
Christianity ever supposed. The Nicene Creed speaks of Jesus, the second 
person of the Trinity, as "begotten by the Father," but says nothing of our 
being begotten by Him. We, on the contrary, at least according to the medieval 
theologians, were created ex nihilo, "out of nothing." Thus, while Jesus is 
the "Son of God," because begotten by the Father, we are merely, as St. Paul 
says, "sons by adoption"; in short, we are created, not begotten. Thus there 
is not the same intimacy between us and the Father that there is between Jesus 
as Son and the Father. Indeed the bond between us and the Father is at best 
a faint reflection of that between the Father and his "only begotten Son." But 
according to this new theodicy each of us, indeed all life, is begotten by God. 
All life is "one in substance with the Father." The New Testament claim that 
Jesus was "like his brethren in every respect" (Hebrews 2: 17) is more radi-
cally true than we hitherto supposed. God has an infinite number of "sons" 
(and daughters), both on this planet and presumably on others, not just one. 
The result should be that we feel much closer to God than we did according 
to one of the traditional theodicies. Our closeness to God is analogous to the 
closeness that exists between a mother and her biological child. We don't 
create our children, we beget them. They are one in flesh with us; they did 
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not come from nothingness, but from our own bodies. How much closer they 
are to us than they would be if we molded them out of clay, let alone noth-
ingness. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the reason God has 
ordained childbirth in the way He has, is to reflect the extraordinarily intimate 
bond that holds us to Him: we are begotten by Him, spiritually of course, not 
made. The same logic that applies to each of us and God also applies to each 
of us and our neighbor, whether our neighbor be human, animal, or vegetable. 
All life, while exquisitely individualized, is one. We swim in a vast sea of 
diversity-in-unity. The implications of this view for the moral life are very 
rich: when we harm another, we harm, in a very real sense, ourselves. Indeed 
this very sense of oneness with all life is the basis of humankind's most 
exalted ethical ideal, the Bodhisattva vow of Mahayana Buddhism. 
Another important implication of this theodicy is what it tells us about 
eschatology. I said above that we would come back to the Upanishads, those 
ancient geysers of mystical insight that we borrowed from so liberally at the 
outset of the argument. Now, however, we must reject one of their central 
claims. Most of the Upanishads hold that the goal of us all should be the 
complete transcendence of our individual identities in an eternal oneness with 
Brahman. "Where there is consciousness of the Self [Brahman, the Ultimate 
Reality], individuality is no more," the sage Yajnavalkya tells his wife 
Maitreyi (Brihadarallyaka, II, iv, 12). Elsewhere we read, "As flowing rivers 
disappear in the sea, losing their names and forms, so a wise man, freed from 
name and form, attains the Purusha [Brahman]" (Mundaka, III, ii, 8). It should 
be apparent by now that, from the point of view of this theodicy, the annihi-
lation of individuals is neither desirable nor possible. This theodicy affirms 
a Brahman, a Father, a Mother, an Allah, as long as there is no final swal-
lowing up of the soul by this Godhead. For such a swallowing up would 
render meaningless most of human experience. What is gained if the liberated 
individual as individual ceases to exist? What is the meaning and purpose of 
that individual's experience, and especially his suffering, through many lives? 
Does such a liberated individual come into possession of some great com-
pleteness, some great joy that he did not possess before he was liberated? 
No, for on an Upanishadic reading he does not even possess the individuality 
that would give us the right to say he is able to possess something; he does 
not even possess himself. Those Jains who see souls in every atom go too 
far, for they glorify solitariness. But they err in the right direction: Better 
their error than the more fundamental one of seeing, like the modern mate-
rialist, no souls anywhere or, seeing them, to reduce them, as Shankara does, 
to one indivisible, distinctionless All. In Death alld Eternal Life, John Hick 
describes our ultimate state as one in which "the ego-aspect of individual 
consciousness has been left behind and the relational aspect has developed 
into a total community which is one-in-many and many-in-one, existing in a 
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state which is probably not embodied and probably not in time. "22 This view 
is consistent with the theodicy developed here and, to my mind, represents 
the Middle Way between the opposite and equally erroneous extremes of an 
unrelieved solitariness and an individuality-canceling absorption. 
A third important implication of this theodicy concerns the world of nature, 
our ecosystem. I titled my theodicy an "environmental theodicy," yet above 
I described matter as "alien" to God and claimed that matter is valuable not 
in itself but only as a means of cultivating individual souls. On the basis of 
this claim some readers might conclude that I am Manichean, a hater of the 
physical, insensitive to nature and its beauties, anti-environmental. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. While it is true that this theodicy implies that 
there is little if any value (or beauty) in a dead planet or universe, it implies 
quite the opposite for a living planet like our earth. A few years ago when 
scientists discovered that Mars was lifeless, the whole world felt disap-
pointment. Mars is a bleak, sterile place. Its value to us is of a secondary, 
borrowed order. How different is a planet like earth. What makes earth 
beautiful, fascinating, and valuable is all its organisms, all the modes of 
spirit suffusing its innumerable bodies. What makes us prefer a forest to 
a desert is the greater presence of spirit in the forest. What makes us plant 
trees and gardens is the innate joy we feel in "spirit management." It is 
fitting that our planet exploding with life should strike us as beautiful, for it 
is the venue of a great happening. Indeed the organisms of earth are this great 
happening. Where there is life, there is divinity. Matter is alien to God's 
nature, but earth is not merely material. Earth is living, divine, and unspeak-
ably precious. For these noblest of reasons it deserves our reverence and 
nurture.23 
Another corollary of this theodicy takes us in the opposite direction from 
matter-to angels. Traditional Christian theology views angels as indepen-
dent, advanced intelligences that never knew flesh. We can have no objection 
to the word "angel" as long as it is used to refer to independent, advanced 
intelligences who for long eons did know flesh but have permanently moved 
beyond it. The logical problem with angels as traditionally understood is that 
if God could create such creatures, He should have created all creatures in 
this way. The ant battle mentioned at the outset of this paper and the innu-
merable other ways that embodied beings suffer are inconsistent with a full-
fledged theism if the suffering was avoidabLe. This theodiey holds that it was 
not. 
Another corollary of this theodicy is that there must be innumerable planets 
in the universe where "spirit buds" are developing. God's fountain of sharing 
could not possibly be limited to our earth, or He would be grossly deficient 
in either power or love. There must be a profusion of other planets where 
individuation is proceeding apace. The vastness of our universe, whieh I 
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believe is necessary to prevent interplanetary meddling, has the additional 
advantage of symbolizing the immense scale of God's soul-making project. 
So immense is this scale that it would not surprise me to learn that whole 
civilizations have been destroyed in an instant when their planets blew up. 
The thought of five and a quarter billion human or humanoid deaths in a 
single instant is horrific to consider, but is it in principle different from the 
same number of deaths suffered over an eighty year period? The process 
of individuation and sanctification would go on either way. I do not mean 
to imply that we should be nonchalant about the nuclear threat to our 
physical survival; we should view it and fight it as a horrible evil, for the 
destruction of a planet would surely involve immense disruptions and 
dislocations. But if our physical destruction should occur through natural, 
unavoidable causes, or even if we should cause it ourselves, it would be 
shortsighted to view the event as finally and irrevocably tragic. I believe the 
Hindu myth of time and eternity, with whole universes breathed in and out 
by Brahma the Creator, has a good measure of wisdom. Such is the scale of 
God's plan. 
There are many more corollaries to this theodicy, but no space here to 
mention them. 
Where More Work Is Needed 
The thesis presented here cannot be adequately elucidated, much less de-
fended, in a single paper. When John Hick read the paper in an early draft, 
he recommended expanding it into a book. And I agree that this must be done, 
either by me or by someone else who, like me, sees the germinal insight 
presented here-namely, the ordeal of individuation~as the key to an under-
standing of the divine telos. More needs to be said especially about (1) an 
omnipotent God's inability to create individual beings by fiat, (2) the myste-
rious process by which the One Spirit is differentiated and individuated, and 
especially (3) the high estimate of suffering that this theodicy claims. One 
critic, Frederick Ferre, responded to an earlier draft of the paper with the 
following question: ~People in panic or great pain actually lose peripheral 
vision, can see only a sma\1 range and can think an even smaller one. What 
happens to the quality of that subjective consciousness when it loses the 
breadth, the variety, the harmony that makes life rich and interconnected?"24 
A few closing remarks about human suffering are in order. 
It would be a serious mistake to glorify suffering. Cruelty to any species 
is not being condoned here; nature brings enough pain without adding to it 
artificially. On the other hand, common sense tells us that some suffering is 
necessary for our own development; we applaud, for example, the young 
person who moves into an alien environment in order to "see how the other 
half lives." And some of us would agree with Simone Weil that affliction is 
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necessary before "the infinitesimal seed of divine love placed in the soul can 
slowly grow and bear fruit in patience. "2S But common sense also tells us 
that much suffering is destructive and unredemptive. Is common sense correct 
in the second instance? 
I think it is. To repeat a point made above, by the time Spirit has evolved 
to the level of a human being, there is no more danger of the soul's losing 
its ontic identity; the stage when that might have happened has passed. Thus 
the violence and rigor of physical pain is no longer necessary: that had (and 
has) its economy at a more primitive level in the evolution of Spirit into souls. 
What is needed at this relatively advanced stage is the refinement, sanctifi-
cation, and enlightenment of souls. On earth we are being readied to move 
permanently into a realm of existence characterized by more refined, less 
dense or "gross" bodies-spiritual bodies, as St. Paul would say. And beyond 
that, as Hick suggests, there will probably come a time when we shuck off 
bodily being altogether and prepare to move into a transcendent, unimagin-
ably fulfilling society of relatively perfected, but always growing souls: the 
"communion of saints" of traditional theologies. The kind of gross suffering 
that Ferre refers to is obviously impossible in such a society, and it is often 
unnecessary even at our present level. The fact that relatively enlightened 
persons here on earth sometimes experience great, unnecessary suffering is 
a fact explained by Hick's notion of epistemic distance. Such suffering is 
surely tragic in the short run, but not in the long. 
We have come a long way from a justification of animal pain. Yet the 
scenario sketched here seems to follow logically, much of it necessarily, from 
such a justification. It should not be thought that this argument presents a 
shred of evidence for God's or the soul's existence; they are both taken for 
granted. The burden of the paper has been to show what kind of world we 
live in if God exists and if He is omnipotent and loving and ifanimals suffer 
as much as they seem to. It is still the case that the ways of the God pictured 
here are not entirely our ways; not in my wildest fancy would I have put 
together such a scenario of creation as defended here if I had not felt con-
strained to by the world we live in-in particular a world in which animals 
suffer great pain-and by the constraints of logical consistency. 
The God that most thoughtful theists worship is a God with one or two 
terrible glitches-a God who is successfully defended only by ignoring some 
glaring aspect of the world in front of their faces. The advantage of this 
theodicy over previous ones is that the God it presents is a "possible God." 
All pain and suffering, animal as well as human, is accounted for, yet God's 
infinite goodness and power, those two essential characteristics that make 
Him worthy of the theist's grateful and loving response, are left intact. 
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